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THE OCCUPATION OF TRUTH

John Dever & James Dever*

"What are Kingdoms but great robberies?"
-Saint Augustine, 5th Century C.E.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The central issue between Israelis and Palestinians is the conflict over
land. Consequently, peace will remain elusive in Palestine until the Israelis
halt the ongoing occupation and exploitation of Palestinian land and resources. Yet wars are fought with words as well as armies. As an imbalance of power between Israelis and Palestinian refugees exists, the creation
of a new Israeli metanarrative can properly contextualize the past six decades of conflict. Once polemic gives way to historical truth the legitimate
aspiration of the Palestinian people for self-determination can be laid bare
before a candid world. It is at that point where a conversation about a
feasible two-state solution may begin.
In our paper, we argue that widespread acceptance of the Israeli "New
Historian" perspective is an essential precondition for peace. During the
last twenty-five years, a new wave of Israeli scholarship challenged the
traditional Zionist triumphal narrative wherein Palestinians eschewed compromise and increasing Israeli occupation of Palestinian land was the only
solution to safeguard Israeli citizens. Indeed, the conclusions of the new
historians shattered many of the central tenets of Israeli historiography that
dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948.
The current plight of Arab-Israelis who experience socioeconomic decline is evidence that a rights-based approach in a one-state solution is unlikely to succeed. As it stands, because a Jewish majority is necessary for
the existence of a Jewish state, the status quo requires that Arab-Israelis
remain perpetual alien residents met with racism, misunderstanding, and
* John P. Dever Jr. holds a L.L.M. in National Security Law from Georgetown University. He
leads the Business Intelligence Unit at General Electric and was the former Global Crisis Management
Leader. Prior to joining the private sector, Mr. Dever was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Northern
District of Illinois, Chicago. Before becoming an AUSA, he was Assistant General Counsel in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Security Law Branch, Counterterrorism Division. He began
his career on active duty as a U.S. Army Judge Advocate where he served on multiple combat
deployments. He is the recipient of the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart Medals. James Dever is a
U.S. Army Judge Advocate. He holds an advanced degree in History and teaches courses in law and
globalization at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, Connecticut. He has published articles on the
Caroline Doctrine of anticipatory self-defense and cyber warfare. In 2013, Attorney Dever conducted a
panel discussion on Capitol Hill at a caucus event sponsored by Congressman Robert E. Andrews. He
discussed problems at the intersection of national and corporate cyber security and raised possible legal
and regulatory solutions.
1. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD Bk. IV, ch. IV (Henry Bettenson, trans., Penguin Classics
2003).
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xenophobia. Accordingly, only a two-state solution offers a viable option
for peace.
The paper begins with a historical investigation into the late nineteenth century when Zionists first began purchasing Palestinian land. During the following British Mandate period, Jews immigrated to Palestine in
increasing numbers and consolidated their grip on the region. After declaring independence, Israel made war upon the Palestinians and forcibly
dispossessed the vast majority from their homeland. As a result of the tumultuous Occupation, two conflicting narratives arose concerning the
"nakba." On the one hand, the classic Palestinian story tells of a brutal
Israeli war of aggression which devastated the indigenous population. On
the other hand, the traditional Israeli narrative is that the Zionist venture is
legitimate due to religious reasons or due to the unique trauma of the Holocaust. In this schema, the Arabs are the aggressors and the vastly outnumbered Israelis desperately fought a defensive action to save themselves
from extermination.
Twenty-five years ago in a dramatic break from past scholarship, the
rise of the Israeli "New Historians" undercut the ahistorical and jingoistic
metanarrative previously embraced by the generations of Israelis who experienced first-hand the trauma of the 1948 conflict. Significantly, by investigating declassified Israeli government sources, these scholars are
creating a more nuanced and accurate history of Palestine. Yet while the
revisionists deserve praise for their willingness to write a critical history of
Israel, they nonetheless merit censure for the lack of Arab voices and Palestinian agency in their works. In addition, the sad truth is that Arab-Israelis form an underclass within Israeli society and suffer both legal and
socioeconomic discrimination at the hands of the Jewish majority. Although their stories must likewise be incorporated into the new metanarrative, those looking to write the first comprehensive history of the IsraelPalestine Conflict need also look within and discover the mechanisms by
which the Israeli judiciary casts a false aura of legitimacy on the state. In
the Elon Moreh case, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that requisition of
land for a Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories had been illegal
because it was situated on private lands and did serve a purely military
purpose. Hailed within and without Israel as a landmark case that proved
the existence of a powerful and independent judiciary, Elon Moreh was
illusory relief which lent credibility to the myth of rights perception about
the willingness of the Israeli Supreme Court to exact meaningful political
change. As it is insufficient to merely forget the past because it renders the
present incoherent, the viability of a two-state solution depends upon the
construction of a fresh metanarrative which offers the chance for Palestinians and Israelis to better understand each other, thereby facilitating selfdetermination, stability, peace, and dignity in Palestine.
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II.

THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

A.

Zionist Purchase of PalestinianLand

Conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis may be traced back to
events before World War II. As a consequence of "increased anti-Semitism
in the late nineteenth century, Zionism emerged as a European-wide political movement." 2 The goal of Zionism was to help Jews escape persecution
in Europe by establishing a national homeland.3 Although early Zionists
considered several sites for the Jewish state, Palestine was ultimately Zionism's target because of its historical ties to the Jewish people.4 Accordingly, the acquisition of Palestinian land was essential to the Zionist
dream.5 While some Jews purchased land for themselves, far more land
was bought by a Jewish National Fund ("Fund") which would lease the
land to individual Jews who were forbidden to sublease or employ nonJews.6 The Zionist plan did not go unnoticed by Arabs but due to an unfortunate Ottoman land registration system in the 1890s that led wealthy
Turks to gain legal title to land in Palestine through questionable means,
Arab farmers oftentimes found themselves tenants of absentee owners.7
And because Fund bought property from the absentee owners, Arab farmers were dispossessed of land that had been in their families for
generations.8
In 1904, Chaim Weizmann became the acknowledged leader among
British Zionists.9 Wielding his influence in the British admiralty during
World War I, Weizmann tried to persuade Lord Balfour, then British foreign secretary, that Britain should sponsor a Jewish state in Palestine because the Jews could bring civilization to the region as well as guard the
Suez Canal.1" By 1917 Weizmann had persuaded Balfour to propose a policy statement to the British cabinet supporting Zionism. 1 The statement
was approved, and Balfour wrote an infamous letter to Lord Rothschild
known as the Balfour Declaration, stating that the British government
"favour[ed] the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people ...

it being clearly understood

that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
2. Stacy Howlett, PalestinianPrivate Property Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

117, 122 (2001).

3. Id.

4. Id. at 122-23.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 123 (citing JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 5-6

(1990)).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
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religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
12
other country.'
"Pursuant to the Balfour Declaration, the British government made
promises to both the Zionists and Palestinian Arabs."'1 3 From the outset,
the Palestinians viewed the Balfour Declaration with suspicion and perceived it as a thinly veiled attempt to create a Jewish state at their expense.14 Three implications of the Balfour Declaration warrant particular
attention: first, it ran contrary to the spirit of pledges for independence
previously given to Arabs; second, Palestine's fate was determined by unilateral consultation with the Zionists thereby utterly ignoring the rights and
interests of the Palestinians; and third, the British had no right to dispose of
Palestine in any event because the declaration was made when the land was
still officially a part of the Ottoman Empire.' 5
B.

The British Mandate for Palestine

In the post-war period, President Wilson's "fourteen points" demonstrated his rather anti-colonial stance and therefore the mandate system
was envisioned as a compromise between colonialism on the one hand and
the creation of a Jewish state on the other. 6 Meanwhile, Turkey was
forced to renounce its claim to the Ottoman Empire and the administration
of Palestine, Transjordan, and what would later become Iraq was given to
Great Britain in 1920.1' Backed by the Balfour Declaration, the Fund
stepped up its purchase of Palestinian land. 8 Furthermore, during the
1920s, the British government permitted greater numbers of Jews to settle
on Arab land. The consequences of ever-increasing Zionist settlement
were plain for all to see and led Arthur Ruppin who headed the Fund to
concede in 1936 that "[o]n every site where we purchase land and where we
settle people the present cultivators will inevitably be dispossessed. 19 In
the early 1930s, as anti-Semitism grew in Hitler's Germany, Britain allowed
immigration at levels that doubled the Jewish population of Palestine between 1931 and 1935.20 That influx increased the Zionist share of the pop-

ulation to thirty percent and following the increase Britain again allowed
substantial new land purchases.21
12. M.E. YAPP, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN NEAR EAST 290 (1987).
13. Howlett, supra note 2, at 124.
14. Eliot Shackelford, Review of From Coexistence to Conquest: InternationalLaw and the Origins of the Arb-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949 by Victor Kattan, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L 638, 640-41 (2012).
15. Howlett, supra note 2, at 124.
16. Id. at 124-25.
17. Id. at 125.
18. JOHN QUIGLEY, THE CASE FOR PALESTINE: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 17
(2005).
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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By 1936, the Mandate System began to deteriorate. The Palestinians
started to organize in both nonviolent and violent groups which aimed to
halt further immigration and land purchases by Jews.22 And Zionist terror
groups emerged to raid Arab villages, plant explosives, and kill Palestinian
civilians.2 3 Upon the end of World War II, frustrated with its inability to
create peace, Britain announced that it was leaving Palestine and turned
the problem over to the UN in April 1947.24 The Mandate System was a
failure because it did not create an independent Palestinian state but instead pursued a half-hearted attempt at establishing a Jewish homeland.
When Britain asked the UN to make recommendations on the issue of Palestine, five Arab states asked the UN General Assembly to take up the
matter as "the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence. '' 26 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Arab nations
were concerned that Britain's open-ended request for a recommendation
on the future governance of Palestine invited the UN to link the issue of
Jewish refugees in Europe with that of Palestine's status.27
C. Israel Declares Independence

In 1947, the UN "created a special committee to investigate the international legal status of the Palestinian territory. ' 28 "The committee determined that the British Mandate should be terminated and that
independence should be granted to Palestine" via Resolution 181.29 Pursuant to Resolution 181, two states were to be created with each guaranteeing
the other certain standards of normative behavior.3" The proposed Jewish
state would have had 56 percent of Palestine thus the plan gave much Arab
territory to the Zionists.31 On the one hand, the day after Resolution 181
was adopted by the Zionists but rejected by the Arab Higher Committee,
the Jewish Agency called on all Jews age seventeen to twenty-five to register for military service in the Haganah.2 On the other hand, the Arab
Higher Committee undertook no military decisions but instead called on
Palestinian Arabs to hold a three-day commercial strike to protest the partition plan. 33 On May 15, 1948, Israel unilaterally declared its independence and full scale war broke out the next day.34 By the spring of 1949
Israel held seventy-seven percent of Palestine which included everything
22.
23.
24.
25.

Howlett, supra note 2, at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127.

26.

QUIGLEY, supra note 18, at 32.

27. Id.
28. Winston Nagan & Aitza Haddad, The Legal and Policy Implications of the Possibility of
PalestinianStatehood, 18 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343, 356 (2012).

29. Id.
30. Id. at 361.
QUIGLEY, supra note 18, at 36.
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id.
34. Howlett, supra note 2, at 128.

31.
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except the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.35 In this manner, a type of
double minority syndrome evolved amongst Israelis and Palestinians
whereby each side perceived itself at once a minority and a majority. 36 The
Palestinian community is a minority in Israel yet part of a regional majority
whereas the Jewish majority community in Israel is a tiny minority when
considered in relation to the rest of the Middle East.37
A central problem regarding the Palestinian refugee community in the
wake of 1948 is that the property issue immediately became intertwined
with the political and diplomatic vicissitudes of the wider Arab-Israeli Conflict. This is the case despite considerable global concern over the refugees
and their plight and notwithstanding repeated regional and international
efforts to isolate and solve this human tragedy separately from the wider
political context of the conflict.3" The losers in this failing process were of
course the refugees and their descendants.39 Efforts toward compensation,
restitution, or the lack of such efforts, therefore were politicized and subject to the changing nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the outset.40
Accordingly, this politicization has fostered two interrelated outcomes:
first, it meant the refugees' needs for resolving their property claims waxed
and waned in the minds of Arabs, Israelis, Americans, and the global community in direct correlation to the various political and military crises that
punctuated the conflict over the past six decades; and second, the property
question was subject to shifting conceptual approaches that were related to
political and military events on the ground yet nonetheless constituted an
entirely different dimension on the conflict.4 1 In the end, the tortured history of the Palestinian refugee property issue serves as a pressing reminder
that if the current populations avoid peace, the task will prove even more
costly for future generations.42
III.

CONFLICTING NARRATIVES

A.

The PalestinianPerspective

The classic Palestinian narrative is that the nakba or "catastrophe" of
1948-49 which resulted in approximately seven to eight hundred thousand
Palestinians losing their homes is a story of colonization, displacement, and
35. Id.
36. Ilan Saban, Theorizing and Tracing the Legal Dimensions of a Control Framework:Law and
the Arab-PalestinianMinority in Israel's First Three Decades (1948-1978), 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 299,
309 (2011).
37. Id.
38.

MICHAEL FISCHBACH, RECORDS OF DISPOSSESSION: PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROPERTY AND

THE ARAB-SREAELI CONFLICT

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 368.

XXVII (2003).
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occupation at the hands of the Israelis.43 In this paradigm, the nakba completed and formalized the loss of their native land that had already occurred through the Zionist colonization project which began in the late
nineteenth century. 4
From this viewpoint, Israel is an illegitimate outcome of the Western
colonial era and in no way should Palestinians have to bear the burden of
compensating Jews for crimes committed upon them by Nazi Germany.45
At the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, about 160,000 Palestinians
were left within Israel's cease-fire borders and were incorporated into the
Jewish state.46 A central tenet of the traditional Palestinian narrative is
that the war devastated the indigenous population who at once became a
stateless and a trans-state people spread across Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, and Egypt.47
Contrary to the dominant Zionist narratives, which locate the Palestinians' displacement as an unintentional product of a defensive war forced
upon the Jewish people, in the Palestinians' eyes, this displacement was no
mere accident induced by the fog or war.48 Rather, the Palestinians understand their expulsion in terms of ethnic cleansing and the culmination of a
Zionist plan to solidify their position in Palestine. 49 Although Israeli and
Palestinian historians disagree both on the relative intentionality of the
forced removals and the level of violence, it is beyond dispute that after the
war the Israeli government destroyed hundreds of Arab villages to clear
the way for the continuation of the state-building enterprise.5" Following
the preemptive Israeli Six Day War of 1967 where Israel captured the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula, Palestinians viewed Israel's continual occupation of their former territory as a
reminder of their loss of homeland and denial of their ethno-nationalism.51

43. Ariel Meyerstein, TransitionalJustice and Post-Conflict Israel/Palestine:Assessing the Applicability of the Truth Commission Paradigm,38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 281, 298 (2007); see generally
Raef Zreik, Palestine,Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse,34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 68 (2004) (analyzing
the three different categories of Palestinians: refugees in exile, those in the Occupied Territories, and
those living as citizens in Israel).
44. Meyerstein, supra note 43, at 298.
45. William Quandt, Israeli-PalestinianPeace Talks: From Oslo to Camp David II, in How IsRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS NEGOTIATE: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS

15 (Tamara Wittes ed., 2005).
46. Saban, supra note 36, at 309.
47. Id.
48. Meyerstein, supra note 43, at 299.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also David Mennie, The Role of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in the Israeli-PalestinianConflict: Should Israel'sObligations Under the Covenant Extend to Gaza
and the Other Occupied Palestinian Territories?, 21 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 511, 520
(2012).
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The Israeli Perspective

The Israeli narrative intuitively frames "the conflict with the Palestinians within a broader and much older history of persecution and [ ] extermination that indicts not just the Arab regimes of the Middle East but most of
the governments of Europe for their disregard for Jewish life within their
borders."5 2 "Central to this collective Jewish and Israeli narrative of suffering and victimhood is the tragedy of the Holocaust" which is often referred to as the "basic trauma of Israeli society."53 On the Israeli side,
therefore, there is a deep feeling that the entire enterprise of modern Zionism, the creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land, is legitimate whether
for religious reasons or because of the unique trauma of the Holocaust.54
Jews not only have the right to a state, most Israelis will argue, but also had
no alternative to the path they took to create and defend it." Since Arabs
and Palestinians were initially unwilling to recognize Israel's existence,
Israel was under no obligation to make concessions on issues such as borders or the Palestinian refugee problem.5 6 War, the Israelis maintain, was
forced upon them and thus the Arabs are seen as the aggressors. 7 In this
regard, Israeli author Amos Oz captures the essence of Israeli victim ideology succinctly: "We Israelis often look at Arabs not as fellow victims but as
an incarnation of our past oppressors: Cossaks, pogrom-makers, Nazis who
have grown mustaches and wrapped themselves in kaffiyehs, but who are
still in the usual business of cutting Jewish throats."58
IV.
A.

THE "NEw HISTORIANS"

The Need For Critical History

Revision in history is salutary because a critical examination at premises refreshes historical inquiry and helps facilitate new understanding.59
The historical truth regarding the Palestine - Israel Conflict exists "somewhere in between these stylized collective memories" but tragically these
metanarratives continue to dominate and fuel the cycles of violence in
which both sides participate.60 Looking at the situation realistically, many
Palestinians fail to recognize the negative cumulative effects that anti-Semitism, the Holocaust, and Arab rejectionism has had on the Jewish
psyche. 6 ' Likewise, most Jews and Israelis fail to grasp how Palestinians
52. Meyerstein, supra note 43, at 299.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Quandt, supra note 45, at 14.
Meyerstein, supra note 43, at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Neil Caplan, Victimhood and Identity: Psychological Obstacles to Israeli Reconcili-

ation with the Palestinians,in

ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN IDENTITIES IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 73
(Kamal Abdel-Malek & David Jacobson eds., 1999)).
59. Anita Shapira, The Failure of Israel's "New Historians" to Explain War and Peace, NEW
REPUBLIC ONLINE (Dec. 1, 2000), http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/rrtw/Shapira.htm.
60. Meyerstein, supra note 43, at 301.
61. Id.
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perceive them as nothing more than colonizers who have unjustly deprived
them of their land. Accordingly, Israelis also fail to understand that Palestinian violence, far from merely being a continuation of hatred against Jews
which has existed for centuries, is rather largely a consequence of the
nakba and the brutality of the Occupation.6" Indeed, the violence and repression of the Occupation to include house demolitions, restriction of
movement, humiliating checkpoints, and extra-judicial killings that often
harm civilians is viewed as state-sponsored terrorism to the Palestinians.6 3
Meanwhile, Israel proclaims its Occupation tactics are necessary defensive
measures required to safeguard innocent Jewish citizens from Arab terrorists. And so it continues, with each population held hostage to a conflict
culture forged from reality as well as their own fears, hatred, assumptions,
and mythologies of the other.64
B. Reinterpreting Israel's Triumphalist Metanarrative
Yet not all myths are created equal. Due to the imbalance of power
existing between the Israelis and Palestinians, the Israeli version of events
remains predominant in the eyes of the global community. A central problem is how the discursive mechanisms of Zionism and the State of Israel
enabled most Jews to "forget" what they once "knew": that the majority of
Palestinians were ethically cleansed from the lands that became Israel.65
Importantly, in recent decades, new scholarship in Israeli historiography
dealing with the period from 1947-49 are beginning to address portions of
the mythological metanarratives mentioned above.6 6 In the late 1980s, a
handful of Israeli scholars and journalists, labeled the "New Historians" or
the "revisionists" achieved notoriety in Israel by publishing several books
on the causes of the 1948 conflict. The scholars principally associated with
the revisionist movement are Benny Morris, Avi Sclaim, Ilan Papp6, Tom
Segev, and Simha Flapan.6 7 Prior to the late 1980s:
Israeli scholars and historians accepted as historical fact several important ideas: that the Jews created Israel out of necessity after their attempts at peaceful negotiation with the
Arabs failed; that the Arabs instigated and initiated the
Arab-Israeli conflict; and that the Arab leadership encouraged the Palestinians to flee to neighboring countries
during the conflict, resulting in the Palestinian refugee
crisis. 68
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
Joel Beinin, Forgetfulnessfor Memory: The Limits of the New IsraeliHistory, 34 J. PALESTINE
STUD. 10 (2005).
66. Irene Gendzier, Weapons of Mass Destruction and What We Don't Know About U.S. Policy
in the Middle East, 21 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 67 (2012).
67. VICTOR KATrAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1891-1949 170-71 (2009).
62.
63.
64.
65.

68. Major Roger Mattioli, Palestine Betrayed, 2010-OcT ARMY LAW. 43, 44 (2010).
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Collectively, these scholars began creating a more nuanced and accurate history by consulting declassified Israeli government documents which
led them closer to the conclusions reached by veteran Palestinian historians
such as Walid Khalidi.6 9 In doing so, the revisionists challenged the traditional view
"that Zionism was beneficent ... that Israel was born into
an uncharitable, predatory world; that Zionist efforts at
compromise and conciliation were rejected by the Arabs;
and that Palestine's Arabs ... for reasons of innate selfishness, xenophobia.., launched a war to extirpate the foreign
plant."70
In ensuing years, the new historians reached five conclusions regarding
the Arab-Israeli conflict: (1) Britain did not arm and secretly encourage its
Arab allies to invade Israel; (2) Israel's victory was not a case of "David
against Goliath;" (3) Arabs did not flee Palestine of their own volition but
were displaced by the Zionists; (4) Arabs did not unite as one to attack the
fledgling Jewish state; and (5) Israel was intransigent at the end of the conflict because Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion did not want to conclude a
peace treaty with the Arab world that would result in territorial concessions or a return of refugees.71 Of course, revisionist history is not unique
to Israel. For instance, knowledge of the Cold War benefited enormously
from the work of scholars armed with repose, hindsight, and access to declassified American and Soviet government documentation. On a positive
note, since the late 1990s, the revisionists' account of the 1948 war is progressively being approved of by Israel's Education Ministry and has even
found its way into some Israeli high school textbooks.72
C. Criticism of the Revisionists
Despite the ability of the revisionist history to detail a more accurate
version of the past, strident critics of the new approach such as traditional
Israeli historian Efraim Karsh insist that revisionist history accomplishes
little more than national self-loathing because it portrays "Zionism as the
original sin underlying the region's violent history."73 In Karsh's view, the
new historians are leftist "politically engaged academics and journalists
who.., have turned the saga of Israel's birth upside down, with aggressors
transformed into hapless victims and vice versa."' 74 Although Karsh
69. KAIrAN, supra note 67, at 171.
70. Benny Morris, The New Historiography:Israel Confronts Its Past, 6 TIKKUN 3, 20 (1988).
71. KAT rAN, supra note 67, at 171. Unfortunately, it is still the case that many international

attorneys locate Israel's conduct during the 1948 conflict as defensive. The staunchest advocate of this
view is Alan Dershowitz, the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, who argued in
2003 that Israel was fighting "a genocidal war of extermination" in 1948. Id. See also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 74 (2003).

72. KArrAN, supra note 67, at 171.

73.
74.

EFRAIM KARSH, FABRICATING ISRAELI HISTORY: THE "NEw HISTORIANS"
EFRAIM KARSH, PALESTINE BETRAYED 4 (2011).

1 (2000).
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charges the revisionists with historical inaccuracy, his own scholarship
demonstrated that he conveniently paints a whitewashed history wherein
the motives of the Israeli people were practically always altruistic and they
repeatedly "extended [their hands] in peace to [their] neighbors." The fallacious nature of that aspect of Karsh's argument is clear. It is sufficient to
remember the chilling words of Ben-Gurion regarding the methodical destruction of Palestinian population centers in 1948 that Israel indeed has
blood on its hands:
"[Our] strategic objective was to destroy the [Palestinian]
urban communities.... [We accomplished this] by the conquest and destruction of the rural areas surrounding most of
the towns. ... Deprived of... food, and raw materials, the

urban communities underwent a process of disintegration ...

which forced them into surrender."76

Nonetheless, if Karsh's claims of bias against the new historians ring
hollow, his criticism that the revisionists habitually ignore Arab sources is
valid. Karsh takes Benny Morris, a leading voice in the revisionist movement, to task for Morris's conclusion in his book 1948 and After: Israeland
the Palestiniansthat "so long as... critics are unable to show exactly how a
given Arab (Arabic) source could and would substantially and accurately
alter, enhance, or correct the picture painted [in Morris' works] . . .the

relative non-use of Arab sources is irrelevant."77 In Morris' narratives,
therefore, like in those of the traditional Israeli historians, Jews are the
subjects of history while Palestinians are the objects of Jewish action.78 Indeed, Morris' empiricist and positivist historical method excludes Palestinian voices nearly to the same degree as the old historians.79 The ground
truth is that a precondition for writing a less jingoistic and mythological
80
Israeli metanarrative is the inclusion of Palestinian and Arab sources.
After all, to write the history of relations between Israel and the Arab
world almost exclusively on the basis of Israeli sources results in myriad
distortions. To take one example, because the Israeli documentation contains a pro-Zionist bias, violent Arab actions are perceived as inevitable
while the Palestinian people are stripped of both their agency and legitimate aspiration for self-determination.81

75. Id. at 1.
76. Mattioli, supra note 68, at 44-45.
77. Karsh, supra note 73, at 4-5. See BENNY MORRIS: 1948 AND AFTER:
TINIANS 44 (1994).
78. Beinin, supra note 65, at 16.
79. Id.
80. Shapira, supra note 59, at *4.
81. Id. at *18.

ISRAEL AND THE PALES-
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THE PLIGHT OF ARAB-ISRAELIS

A.

Arab-Israeli Disenfranchisement

[VOL. 33:39

A further limitation of the New Historians' perspective is their overwhelming focus on the events surrounding the beginning of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. While uncovering a more nuanced truth about that
tumultuous period is necessary, so too is focusing on the dreadful progression of discrimination against Arab-Israelis. In large measure, Arab-Israelis form a type of underclass within Israeli society and without proper
historical contextualization their plight continues to suffer from mainstream Jewish prejudice built in part upon an ahistorical understanding of
why Arab-Israelis face a daunting journey toward upward social mobility.
Palestinian Arabs in Israel number approximately 1.5 million people, comprising 20 percent of the state's population.82 They are descended from
about the Arabs who remained inside Israel after the 1948 war.83 ArabIsraelis thus constitute an indigenous minority. Although some Arab-Israelis would like to see Israel become a bi-national state, others make more
radical claims. As Mohammed Dahle, the attorney who created the Legal
Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has argued: "[W]e are not a minority .... If you open an atlas... you will see a billion and a half Muslims .... At the end of the day, it is the natives, not the immigrants, who

have a supreme right to the country. '8 4 The Israeli government has acknowledged the cultural distinctiveness of Arab-Israelis by recognizing
Arabic as an official language, exempting Palestinians from mandatory military service, creating an Arabic-language school system, and maintaining
Islamic shari'acourts.8 5 Though eventually granted civic rights, the Arab
community in Israel has suffered a long history of discrimination due to the
colwidespread perception amongst Jews that Arab-Israelis are a "fifth
86
state.
the
against
rebel
to
opportunity
first
the
for
looking
umn"
B.

Jews Over Palestinians

The social reality of the Arab-Israeli minority in Israel exposes both a
legal and socioeconomic discrimination against the population.87 Formal
discrimination has been secured in the law since the establishment of Israel,
and de facto socioeconomic discrimination exists due to Jewish prejudice
and the living conditions of Arab-Israelis.88 Israeli law contains a number
of provisions that openly formalize inequality between Jews and Arabs.
For example, all eleven of Israel's Basic Laws express a fundamental desire
82. Robert Nicholson, Legal Intifada: Palestinian NGOs and Resistance Litigation in Israeli
Courts, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 381, 382 (2012).
83. Id.
84. Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 453, 479
(2003).
85. Id.
86. Meyerstein, supra note 43, at 299.
87. Yousef Jabareen, Constitution building and Equality in Deeply-Divided Societies: The Case of
the Palestinian-ArabMinority in Israel, 26 Wis. INT'L L. J. 345, 360 (2008).
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to preserve the Jewish character of the state thereby instilling an "ethnic
affiliation" in these laws which results in a legal arrangement that privileges
Jews over Arabs.89 From a democratic perspective, defining the essence of
the state according to religion and ethnicity is clearly problematic in a
country wherein one-fifth of the population is not represented.9 ° In the
realm of symbolism, moreover, the Israeli anthem according to law is the
Hatikva or "The Hope," and the following text is the wording included in
the law which demonstrates its unsuitability for Arab Israelis: "As long as
deep in the heart, the soul of a Jew years, and forward to the East, to Zion,
an eye looks, our hope will not be lost, the hope of two thousand years, to
be a free nation in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem."91
A further general bias against Arab-Israelis exists in Israeli law with
respect to immigration and citizenship as established in the 1950 Law of
Return. Pursuant to the Law of Return, "every Jew" has a "right to come
[to Israel]." 92 This unrestricted right of immigration for Jews is deemed a
basic aspect of the idea of a Jewish state.93 As Ben-Gurion explained,
Israel "is not a Jewish State only because Jews constitute a majority, but a
State for Jews wherever they are, and for every Jew who wants to be
here."94 Furthermore, the 1952 Nationality Law conferred Israeli citizenship automatically on Jews who, inter alia, maintained continuous residence
in Israel from May 14, 1948 to July 14, 1952. 9 ' However, Arab-Israelis displaced in 1948 have no right under the Israeli Law of Return and were
excluded from the Nationality Law under the pretense of disloyalty.96 Israeli journalist Daniel Rubinstein has gone so far as to describe the Law of
Return as "over discrimination" of the kind that "was the basis for the
apartheid regime in South Africa."' 97 Currently, some progressive Jews see
the Law of Return as an obstacle to full democracy in Israel.98 Revisionist
Tom Segev notes that "although the Law of Return was originally designed
to restore historical justice to the scattered and beleaguered Jewish people,
it has.., been discriminatory to the Arab citizens of Israel and, hence, has
jeopardized full democracy." 9 9 Similarly, Israeli political scientist Ilan
Peleg argues that Ben-Gurion laid the foundation for an ethnocentric, illiberal Israel when he defended the Law of Return before the Knesset.100
89.
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Among the most pernicious and discriminatory Israeli laws was the
Absentees' Property Law, adopted in 1950, which permitted the confiscation of the land of a person deemed an "absentee." 101 The law defined an
"absentee" to include any Palestinian who in 1948 left the land to go either
10 2
to another state or to an area of Palestine held by Arab League forces.
Forbidden to return to their homes even though many were living in Israel,
these unfortunate Palestinians were given the incongruous appellation of
"present absentees."' 1 3 Importantly, although some Jews would have qualified as "present absentees" under the law, it was implemented only against
Arabs.' 04 Yet, because the Absentees' Property Law permitted confiscation but did not provide the Israeli government title to the land seized, the
Knesset devised the Land Acquisition Law which gave the state title to
confiscated territory. 5 Jewish existentialist philosopher Martin Buber
condemned the Land Acquisition Law as amounting to a "robbery of the
land" of Palestine's Arabs. Nonetheless, despite the startling discriminatory nature of many of these laws, the Israeli democratic system places a
firm limit on the scope of change: no one may use the political process to
change the Zionist character of Israel because no political party that denies
the nature of the state may stand in elections.'0 6 Therefore, in fighting for
their rights, Arab-Israelis confront a Gordian knot: how to facilitate their
goal of self-determination from within a society that is designed to deliberately cast them as second-class citizens?
C. Palestinian Underclass
The socioeconomic discrimination against Arab-Israelis is especially
apparent with respect to the allocation and distribution of government
funds.'0 7 The scarcity of budgetary investments tailored to the needs of the
Arab-Israeli population over more than six decades has led to the creation
of abysmal gaps between Jews and Arabs in practically all areas of life including income levels, unemployment, poverty rates, the extent of infrastructure, environmental conditions, crowded housing conditions, infant
mortality and life expectancy rates, drop-out rates from state institutions of
education, rates of incarceration, and more.' 0 8 In other words, the inferior
legal status of Arab-Israelis is compounded by deep-seated socioeconomic
inferiority.' 0 9 As Professor Ruth Gavison, a leading constitutional law
scholar on the exclusion of Arab-Israelis within Israel intoned, "Where the
State of Israel exists, the Arabs are denied the possibility of controlling
101. Michael Kagan, Restitution as a Remedy for Refugee Property Claims in the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 421, 435 (2007).

102. QUIGLEY, supra note 18, at 107.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 108.
105. Id.
106.
ISRAEL 19

HUSSEIN ABU HUSSEIN & FIONA McKAY, ACCESS DENIED: PALESTINIAN LAND RIGHTS IN

(2003).

107. Jabareen, supra note 87, at 381.

108. Id. at 381-82.
109. Id. at 383.

2014]

THE OCCUPATION OF TRUTH

their public-cultural life.... The State is running an enterprise in which the
Arab minority are not full partners, and its laws prejudice their interests in
order to serve others."' n Arab-Israelis thus inhabit an uneasy middle
ground alienated from both Israeli and Palestinian society.
In regards to education, the Israeli Supreme Court has at times supported the civic rights of Arab-Israelis. The Court recently held in Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister of
Israel that a governmental classification that financially benefited Jewish
educational zones to the detriment of the local Palestinian populace was
void because the government is responsible for giving benefits to Arabs as
well as Jews."' Delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Barak
explained in a well-reasoned manner that:
the way in which the government demarcated the national
priority areas in education achieved a discriminatory result,
whether it was an intentional result or not. The geographic
demarcation along the lines that were chosen led to a result
in which the 500 towns that received the status of a national
priority area for the purpose of benefits in education included only four small Arab towns.... This is a discriminatory result that cannot stand. This is a result that Israeli
democracy cannot tolerate. The effect of the government's
decision is that it discriminates against 12the members of the
Arab sector in the field of education."
Additionally, in a case with the same spirit, the Supreme Court imposed a duty on the Israeli Ministry of Education to construct a secondary
school near an Arab Bedouin village in order to facilitate the local population to maintain its traditions and prevent female students from riding in a
school bus alongside male students." 3
A handful of remarkable cases aside, however, a comparative study on
race and ethnicity in Israel's public schools reveals that Arab- Israelis suffer from institutional segregation and a widespread neglect of the importance of integration." 4 Although it has been proven that the "hidden
assumption that tolerance, curiosity, and dialogue with the 'other' can be
taught as theoretical, and not practical, issues, and that random encounters
[between Jews and Arabs] can make up for what is lacking in practice" is
false, nonetheless mainstream Israeli society still balks at a fully integrated
110. Id. at 384.
111. See HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister
of Israel,ISR. L. R. 105 (2006), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/03/630/111/a18/03111630.
al8.pdf.
112. Id. at 126, 127.
113. Zeev Segal, Do Israeli Arabs Have Collective Rights?, 12 J. L. SOCIETY 94, 104 (2011); see
also Abou Sbila v. Minister of Education (2007) (Isr.).
114. Yishai Blank, Brown in Jerusalem: A Comparative Look on Race and Ethnicity in Public
Schools, 38 URBAN LAWYER 367, 433 (2006).
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school system." 5 Therefore, without almost a complete overhaul of the
Israeli public education system, the deep segregation that characterizes the
institution and builds barriers instead of bridges will continue to haunt Israeli society.1 16 The real-world consequences of inaction is a longitudinal
incapacity for the different members of the politic to conduct meaningful
dialogue with each other as a significant minority of the population further
devolves into an underclass by lacking the tools which can only be provided
by a well-funded education program to rise above difficult social conditions
and achieve upward mobility.1 7
VI.
A.

THE OBFUSCATION OF JUSTICE

The Israeli Supreme Court

It is inadequate for a new comprehensive history of Palestine to
merely include Arab sources and Palestinian voices. Scholars must also
critically examine past assumptions and create a new synthesis to challenge
the received wisdom of convenient mythologies. The Israeli Supreme
Court serves a two-fold function: as a High Court of Appeal, hearing appeals from district courts, and as a High Court of Justice with original jurisdiction over disputes between individuals and the state in matters that are
outside the jurisdiction of other courts and tribunals." 8 Judicial review, the
power of a court to declare the actions of political branches unconstitutional is an American invention that in the words American historian
Charles Beard constitutes "the most unique contribution to the science of
government which has been made by American political genius."' 19 The
system of judicial review has earned worldwide respect and administration
adopted in recent decades by democratic regimes
and has been increasingly
20
to include Israel.'
On a certain level, it is extraordinary that Israel adopted judicial review because it lacks a formal written document that may "be labeled a
constitution; Israel's legislative body, the Knesset, like its British model,
controls the jurisdiction of the courts; and no Act of the Knesset has expressly endowed the Court with the necessary competence.' 12' Judicial review has frequently been mentioned in response to criticism of Israeli
government actions in the Occupied Territories. For instance, in 1993, lawyers in the Military Advocate-General's Unit of the IDF declared:
115. Id.
116. Id. at 434.
117. Id.
118. Ronen Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel's
High Court of Justice, 25 LAW & Soc. REV. 781, 784 (1990).
119. Malvina Halberstam, Judicial Review, A Comparative Perspective: Israel, Canada, and the
United States, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2393, 2431 (2010).
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judicial review by Israel's highest Court has not only provided a form of redress for the grievances of Area inhabitants and a safeguard for their rights; it has also provided a
powerful symbol and reminder to the officials of the Military Government and Civil Administration of the
supremacy of law and legal institutions and of the omnipresence of the Rule of Law wherever Israeli officials' writ may
22

run.1

Judicial review of government action has two primary functions: that
of imprinting governmental action with the stamp of legitimacy, and that of
checking the political branches of government. 123 Although the Israeli Supreme Court has done an excellent job of fostering a perception of legitimacy regarding the Israeli government, it has been woefully inadequate in
checking the abuse of state power in relation to the Palestinian people.
Indeed, by clothing acts of the Israeli military in a cloak of legality, the
Court justifies and rationalizes these decisions.124 Even if this legal sleight
of hand has failed to produce legitimization in the eyes of Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories, it has done so for both the Israeli public, in
whose name the Israeli military takes action, and for international observers sympathetic to Israel's traditional metanarrative. 25 More worrisome
still, the few "landmark" cases where the Court has decided against the
Israeli military, serve merely to enhance the legitimizing function of the
court by reinforcing the "image of the Court as an impartial
body which
1 26
boldly challenges the government in pursuit of justice."'
B.

Radical Israeli Settlement

Israeli Supreme Court records indicate that in almost two decades after the 1967 Six Day War, residents of the Occupied Territories submitted
557 petitions.127 Of those cases, the vast majority were removed, compromised, or reached settlement but sixty-five reached adjudication and were
officially published as Israeli Supreme Court decisions in matters of dispute
between the Israeli government and its agents to include military authorities and the residents of the Occupied Territories. 128 Five out of the sixtyfive cases upheld at least a portion of the petitioners' arguments. 29 The
most famous of these five cases is Dawikat et. al. v. Government of Israel
(1979), commonly referred to as the Elon Moreh case.
122. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 3 (2002).
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"Although Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations prohibits an occupying force from confiscating the private property of an occupied population, Article 52 states an exception to this rule for temporary military
needs. ' 13° Utilizing this loophole, "between 1968 and 1979, Israel captured
a vast amount of private Palestinian property for what was then defined as
military purposes. "131 "Prime Minister Menachem Begin, of the [rightwing] Likud Party, saw the West Bank as an area with which the Jewish
people had a special historical connection because it is the area where the
Jewish Kingdom of biblical times had thrived.' 1 32 Prior Jewish settlements
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were built in the early 1970s pursuant
to the military commander's claim that the settlements were necessary outposts to create a security barrier of standoff distance against possible attacks from the East. 1 33 "In previous cases, the Court was willing to accept
that theory, especially because the land in some of the cases was not pri1 34
vately owned."'
In January 1979, at the height of the controversy in Israel over the
terms of the Camp David agreement and the fears of the Jewish settlers'
movement that Jewish settlement in all the Occupied Territories was at an
end, members of a militant sect set up an unauthorized settlement and demanded that the Israeli government allow them to remain. 1 The Israeli
government was highly sensitive to the charge that it was reneging on its
political and ideological commitment to Jewish settlement in all of the land
of Israel. 136 At the same time, however, the government was eager to show
that it, and not the settlers' movement, was setting policy. 137 Consequently,
government representatives managed to convince the settlers to leave the
1 38
area after promising that a settlement would be established in the region.
The Cabinet Committee on Settlement thereafter examined potential settlement sites and decided upon one located on private land. 139 The chief of
staff then gave his approval for requisition of the land for military purposes
which was endorsed by the Cabinet in a majority vote, but the minister of
defense and the foreign minister joined the deputy prime minister in opposing the decision. 1 4 Thereafter, an order was signed by the Israeli Defense Forces commander in the West Bank requisitioning about 700
130. Irus Braverman, "The Tree is the Enemy Soldier":A SociologicalMaking of War Landscapes
in the Occupied West Bank, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 449, 456 (2008).
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dunams of land "for the needs of the army" and two days later Israeli civilpreparing the requisition
ians with Israeli Defense Forces backing began
14 1
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C. The Elon Moreh Case
The land requisitioned for Elon Moreh was uncultivated, but seventeen Arabs who owned 125 dunams of the land successfully challenged the
action before the Israeli Supreme Court. 142 The Elon Moreh case produced three different opinions, the majority written by Deputy President
Justice Landau in which two other Justices concurred and separate concurring opinions by Justices Witkon and Bekhor. 143 Overall, the opinions
paint a negative portrait of the settlers and their actions. Indeed, Justice
Landau's opinion was highly critical of the speed that the requisition and
initial construction occurred and the impropriety of the military governor
having given notice to the village mukhtar rather than the actual landowners which were steps that created "the impression.., the occupation of the
land was organized as a military operation by employing an element of
surprise and in order to forestall the 'danger' of intervention by the Court
on an application by the landowners before work began in the area. "144
Essentially, in Elon Moreh, it was difficult for the Court to be convinced that a security rationale was indeed behind the confiscation of land.
In this regard, the settlers certainly did not help their own case. Unlike the
settlers in the Beth-El case, wherein the Court determined certain settlements fulfilled a security function, the Elon Moreh Court permitted the
settlers to file affidavits supporting their position. 45 "While the military
commander stated that the settlement was necessary for the security of
Israel, the settlers themselves attested that the reason for the settlement
was the fulfillment of the 'right of return' of Jews to their historic homeland.'

46

Further undercutting the military commander's assertion were

other segments of the Israeli Defense Forces which stated that there was no
47
real security reason in the particular spot chosen for the settlement.1' 48
"The Court therefore concluded that the order was ultra vires and void.'
In Justice Landau's words, "the military needs referred to in [Article 52 of
the 1907 Hague Regulations] cannot include, on any reasonable interpretation, national security needs in the broad sense," that
is, the broad political
49
perspective of the Israeli government and settlers.'
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Continued Jewish Settlement on Palestinian Land

The Elon Moreh Court took pains to extricate itself from the highly
contentious political debate surrounding the issue of Jewish settlements in
the West Bank and its implication for Israel's security. 150 Indeed, in this
isolated and well-differentiated decision, the Court established new limitations on the ability of future petitioners to successfully ward off land
seizures and provided a sounder legal basis for future takeovers. 151 Similarly, the Court also held that in the future it would not intervene in matters of dispute concerning the ownership status of land and that such
disputes would be heard before a military appeal board. 152 Accordingly, in
the wake of the Elon Moreh case, the number of petitions regarding land
seizures fell precipitously and those submitted for adjudication were
dismissed. 53
In the wake of the Court's ruling, Prime Minister Begin pronounced
that the case showed the world that "[t]here are judges in Jerusalem" and
that the security establishment would abide by the order of the Court. 5 4
Moreover, the Israeli government pursued an intensive policy aimed at defining and gaining control over state lands on which civilian settlements
were subsequently constructed. 55 As a result, Elon Moreh is the last decision dealing with requisition of private land for civilian settlements. Later
decisions deal with the steps taken to declare land as state land and other
aspects of the settlement policy, such as planning decisions, building of
roads and expropriation of Palestinian land for those purposes. 56 Therefore, Elon Moreh is an essential part of what must become the new Israeli
metanarrative: in striking down egregious conduct by the military commander and radical Israeli settlers, and only that conduct, the Court has de
facto allowed the settlement project and corollary diminution of Palestinian rights to continue unabated.
VII.

A.

LIVING HiSTORY

The Insufficiency of Forgetting

Beginning in the 1920s, it was obvious to those not blinded by bias that
the Zionist project was taking Palestine in a direction incompatible with
the rights of the Palestinian people.' 7 The Jewish immigration allowed by
the British Mandate was a compromise between a Western world that was

starting to have misgivings about the ethos of colonialism but had not yet
embraced self-determination. 58 From the older perspective of colonialism,
150.
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the insertion of Jews into Palestine was acceptable, but for Arabs who
sought immediate independence, the situation was untenable. Finding itself unequal to the task of either keeping peace or ascertaining a solution
to the matter, Britain withdrew from Palestine. If World War II marked
the end of the British Empire as a first-rate power, it defined the United
States along with the Soviet Union as the two new global superpowers.
With oil as the attraction, the United States began to inject itself into the
domestic politics of the Middle East.159 Intent on fostering its own power,
the United States pushed the partition plan through the UN General Assembly despite the fact that numerous non-European UN members viewed
partition as inconsistent with the national rights of Palestine's Arab population.' 60 Although the UN Security Council bears responsibility, under
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, for maintaining the peace internationally, it
did little to affect the situation in Palestine in 1948 as the Jewish Agency
expelled the indigenous Arab people and extended its control. 61 And
when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, the Security Council again failed to correctly identify Israel as the aggressor or take
62
meaningful action to force Israel to withdraw.
The global community only stands to gain from the establishment of a
Palestinian state that could coexist peacefully with the state of Israel.' 63
The Palestinians have long tried to create an independent, sovereign state
in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip which has
been continually occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Day War. The 1993
Oslo Accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel led
to mutual recognition. However, two decades of on again, off again peace
talks have failed to produce a permanent settlement. The latest round of
direct negotiations broke down in 2010.164 In an upward trend, however,
the UN General Assembly last month endorsed an upgraded UN status for
the Palestinian Authority despite strong opposition from both the United
States and Israel.' 6 5 The resolution elevates their status from "non-member observer entity" to "non-member observer state," the same category as
the Vatican, which Palestinians hope will even the playing field in their
negotiations with Israel. 6 6 In response, Israel declared its willingness to
live in peace with a Palestinian state but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cautioned that "for peace to endure, Israel's security must be protected, the Palestinians must recognize the Jewish state and they must be
1 67
prepared to end the conflict with Israel once and for all.'
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Showing an increasing willingness to support Palestinian self-determination and to criticize Israel, the U.S. State Department, on December 18,
2012, accused Israel of engaging in a "pattern of provocative action" that
calls into question the statements from Israeli politicians that Israel is committed to a lasting peace in Palestine.' 68 Indeed, a State Department
spokeswoman went so far as to say
"[The United States is] deeply disappointed that Israel insists on continuing this pattern of provocative action....
These repeated announcements and plans of new construction run counter to the cause of peace. Israel's leaders continually say that they support a path towards a two-state
solution, yet these actions only put that goal further at
risk."' 69
The recognition of the Palestinian state holds within it the promise of moving all parties past this terrible period of war, suffering, acrimony, and impasse.' 70 In doing so, Palestinians and Israelis may achieve selfdetermination, independent stability, widespread peace, and essential
71
dignity.
B.

Toward a New Future

The forced exile of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 1948, and
again in 1967, for many Palestinians was, and remains today, the essence of
their conflict with Israel. 172 The new and inclusive metanarrative of Palestine should therefore rests upon three pillars: a reimaging of the genesis of
the conflict, recovering Arab-Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab voices and
agency, and a candid assessment of the mechanisms whereby the Jewish
state reinforces an illusion of legitimacy. The war of words fought by
Israel's new and old historians which largely centers upon competing narratives of the 1948 war is simply insufficient to produce the kind and extent of
understanding that must be attained if a viable two-state solution has a
chance of implementation. If the history of Palestine has revealed nothing
else it is that the continuing deprivation of Palestinian land fuels a cycle of
violence from which innocent Palestinians and Israelis may not otherwise
be freed.
The clash of narratives is not simply an academic question of historiography. Recently, a proposed law, popularly known as the "nakba law"
states that any public demonstration of mourning during Israel's Independence Day would be considered a felony and punishable by up to three
168. Matthew Lee, US Hits Israel Hard on Settlement Plans,YAHOO NEws (Dec. 18, 2012), http://
news.yahoo.com/us-hits-israel-hard-settlement-plans-201526251.html.
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years of imprisonment. 73 The fear of the Palestinian counter-memory of
the horrors of Israeli occupation is apparently so intense that the law does
not even mention the word nakba and even fails to elaborate the reasons
why Palestinians feel the need to mourn the loss of their homeland. 74 Yet
notwithstanding the insufficiency of the law, the rationale behind it is not
new to the Israeli Supreme Court.1 75 In truth, the judgments of the High
Court of Justice show that the problem exists even in landmark cases where
the Court strongly defended the rights of Palestinian citizens against discriminatory policies. 1 76 For example, in the celebrated Ka'adan decision,
viewed by many as Israel's Brown v. Board of Education in terms of its
commitment to desegregation, the Court protected the right of a Palestinian citizen to buy a house in a communal Jewish village. 7 7 In writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Barak adopted a "future oriented" approach under
which future plaintiffs are encouraged to exclude the story of the nakba
voluntarily and not claim its continuing relevance to explain such everyday
facets of Arab-Israeli and Palestinian life such as the unequal distribution
of land in Israel. 178 In doing so, this methodology sanitizes the Court's
approach by enabling it to amend discriminatory practices only on an individual basis and thus sanctioning by proxy societal amnesia reminiscent of
the short-sighted approach
advocated by Israeli intellectual Yehuda Elkana
' 79
"in favor of forgetting.'
The ongoing discrimination of Arab-Israelis is evidence that a onestate solution would not suffice to guarantee full civic rights and the socioeconomic equality of Palestinians living in Israel. Israel will not cease to be
a Jewish state, and it follows that Israel must not extend its sovereignty
over too large a Palestinian population thereby placing its status quo existence in jeopardy. A two-state solution, however, has much to recommend
itself. After all, a Palestinian state alongside Israel would go far in providing Arabs with a full sense of membership in the polity that they cannot
otherwise acquire from a Jewish nation.' 80 Moreover, it is beyond question
that a gulf exists between the welfare and political participation of Jews
compared to that of Arabs. 18' Important, too, the issue of Palestinian
statehood must be placed in context of wider developments in the Middle
East. The recent "Arab Spring" was an assertion of unilateral initiative for
popular democratic change on behalf of the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Syria.'82 Yet while the Arab Spring received positive support
173. Leora Bilsky, The Habibi Libel Trial: Defamation and the Hidden-Community Basis of Criminal Law, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 617, 624 (2011).
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from the global community the Palestinian people have been denied these
same universal rights.183
C. A New Understanding
On May 19, 2011, President Obama delivered a major policy speech at
the State Department outlining United States policy in response to the "ex'
traordinary change taking place in the Middle East and North Africa."184
In laying out his position, President Obama remarked that:
[A] lasting peace will involve two states for two peoples:
Israel as a Jewish state and homeland of the Jewish people,
and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people, each state enjoying self-determination, mutual
recognition, and peace ....

The Palestinian people must

have the right to govern themselves, and reach their full potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state. As for security,
every state has the right to self-defense, and Israel must be
able to defend itself-by itself-against any threat .... The

full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces should
be coordinated with the assumption of Palestinian security
responsibility in a sovereign, non-militarized state.' 85
President Obama's policy statement therefore included a contradiction: if the Palestinian state is indeed to be sovereign, what right does any
nation to include the United States have to insist the Palestinian State be
non-militarized?"8 6 Some scholars believe Palestinians might seriously consider voluntarily adopting a non-militarized status because forsaking their
insistence on a military would permit them to devote the majority of their
resources to economic development as well as externalize much of the cost
of protecting their independence from external threat to explicit or implicit
international or regional guarantors.18 7 Most importantly, these scholars
argue that by eliminating the military, Palestinians would eliminate an institution which in the Middle East and other areas of the world such as
Latin America has often turned inward to influence, usurp, or undermine
the power of democratic governments.8 8 Yet the confounding variable at
the heart of both President Obama's assumption and the well-intentioned
arguments of scholars is neither is adequately familiar with the accurate
history of Palestine. Therefore, a final benefit to the introduction of a
reimagined metanarrative is it provides context for the reasons why Palestinians employed violence against the Israelis. Far from an indiscriminate
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desire to kill innocent Jewish men, women, and children, Palestinian violence has historical antecedents in the brutality of the Israeli occupation.
Therefore, by understanding the history of the region, an apparent conclusion presents itself: an armed Palestine will not necessarily destabilize the
region if the legitimate aspiration of its people for security and self-determination is realized.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

While Israeli scholars must incorporate Arab sources to achieve a
more representative history of Palestine, Palestinian writers are likewise
starting to challenge Arab histories of 1948 that "have [hitherto] been
marked by apologetics, self-justification, onus-shifting and conspiracy theories. ' 11 9 For instance, Rashid Khalidi writes to expose the "tendency in...
[Palestinian] historiography.

. .

that denies the Palestinian agency in what

happened, or indeed any responsibility for their own fate." 190 Likewise,
the renowned scholar Edward Said rejected the propensity on behalf
of certain Palestinians to downgrade the Holocaust: "[A]s Palestinians
we demand consideration and reparations from them without in any way
minimizing their own history of suffering and genocide. . . . [W]e must
think of our histories together ... free of any exclusionary, denial-based

schemes." 19 ' Therefore, due to the epistemological transformation
amongst Arab and Israeli academics over the past twenty-five years, there
is at present a golden opportunity for the creation of an accurate history of
Israeli-Palestinian relations. 192 However, by failing to sufficiently integrate
Arab-Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab sources, the revisionists limited a priori
the conclusions that might be drawn from a reimagining of 1948.193 Furthermore, due to the imbalance of power inherent between Israel and Palestine, it is incumbent upon Israeli scholars to critically examine their own
government to ascertain how illusions of legitimacy are grafted upon the
state which serve to bolster ahistorical mythologies and fear of the "other."
On the one hand, from the view of certain Palestinians, the creation of
Israel in 1948, the conquest of land in the pre-emptive Six Day War and the
ensuing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are regarded as justifications for violent acts of terrorism. On the other hand,
Israel's defensive action based upon the ongoing Palestinian terrorism
which has increased during the last decade combined with virulent discrimination of Arab-Israelis within Israel makes a one-state solution untenable
at best. Therefore, the sole avenue for a lasting peace in Palestine is a twostate solution. Once Israeli Jews are exposed to the new metanarrative the
hope is they will recognize the state's three fundamental responsibilities
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toward Arab-Israelis and Palestinians: first, Jews must acknowledge that
the Jewish state has been and will continue to be a burden for Arab-Israelis
and Palestinians; second, Jewish citizens must spur the government to immediately staunch the most pressing needs of the Arab community and
promote the civil equality of all citizens; and third, there must be a realistic
conversation regarding security concerns and the legitimate aspiration for
self-determination on behalf of both Israelis and Palestinians. The new history therefore creates the necessary preconditions which must exist before
a candid discussion about a two-state solution may begin. There is hope for
peace in Palestine but the path to a permanent solution lies first in rediscovering the past which will illuminate the way forward.

